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Concepts

Key concepts & terminology

Risk management has a vocabulary that looks like ordinary English and is not. A hazard is not a risk, a hazardous situation is not a harm, and the app keeps them in separate fields because the standard keeps them separate. This page defines the terms, then explains scoring, control, and the statuses.

The vocabulary

Hazard
A potential source of harm. It exists whether or not anyone is exposed to it. Electricity in a mains cable is a hazard.
Hazardous situation
A circumstance in which people, property, or the environment are exposed to a hazard. Touching a frayed mains cable is a hazardous situation.
Sequence of events
What has to happen for the hazard to become a hazardous situation. This is the field where you write the chain, and it is what makes a risk reviewable by someone who was not in the room.
Harm
Injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment. Harm is the outcome, not the situation that produced it.
Severity
How bad the harm is. Severity belongs to the harm, not to the risk, so every risk naming that harm inherits the same severity.
Risk
The combination of the probability of harm occurring and the severity of that harm. A risk is the assessment, not the hazard it starts from.
Risk control measure
An action taken to reduce risk, by inherent safety in the design, by a protective measure, or by information for safety.
Residual risk
The risk that is left once the controls are in place and verified. This is the number that gets accepted or rejected.
Safety characteristic
Any property of the device whose deviation from its intended value or behaviour could lead to a hazard or a harm: a dimension, a material, an output level, a software function. Ruling on each one is how you find the hazards you would otherwise miss.
Multi-fault
An assessment of what happens when more than one fault is present at the same time. Only some products need it, and the applicable standards say which.

The four kinds of safety risk

Every safety risk carries a Category, and the category decides which fields the app requires. The four categories are four ways of looking at the same product, and they are usually run in this order, because each one has something to hand to the next.

CategoryMethodWhat it examines
HazardHazard analysisTop-down, run early. Starts from the hazard lists in the standards and works forward to what could go wrong. Its risk controls become inputs to the design and the architecture.
DesignDesign FMEABottom-up. Starts from a failure mode in a part or a component and asks how that failure contributes to a hazardous situation.
ProcessProcess FMEABottom-up. Starts from a failure mode in a process step, usually a manufacturing work instruction, and asks how that error contributes to a hazardous situation.
UseUse-related risk assessmentBottom-up. Starts from a use error in a use scenario and asks how that error contributes to a hazardous situation.

Changing the category partway through an assessment can move the work item backwards. Each category requires a different set of fields, so the app re-checks the item against the new category and reopens the assessment if anything the new category needs is still empty.

How a risk is scored

ISO 14971 splits the probability of harm in two, and the app scores both separately.

P1
The probability of the hazardous situation occurring at all.
P2
The probability of that hazardous situation going on to cause harm.
Severity
Not entered on the risk. It comes from the harm you selected, which is why the harm list has to be right before scoring starts.

You enter P1 and P2. The app computes the overall probability from them, then reads the risk level off the matrix using that probability and the severity. All four of those values are read-only on the work item: two because they are calculated, and severity because it belongs to the harm. The bands, the matrix, and the acceptability criteria are set per space. See Set up Safety Risks.

Every risk is scored twice, once before controls (the initial score) and once after (the residual score), using the same P1, P2, and severity.

A worked example

Billy goes surfing. The example is not medical, which is the point: it separates the terms cleanly enough that you can see which field each piece of the story belongs in.

FieldBilly
HazardA shark in the water.
Sequence of eventsBilly enters the ocean without checking for hazards, then swims near the shark.
Hazardous situationBilly is swimming in an area where a shark is nearby.
HarmShark bite.
SeverityCatastrophic, from the harm.
Initial P1Remote. The probability of Billy entering an area where a shark is present.
Initial P2Occasional. The probability of the shark attacking once Billy is near.
Initial risk levelRemote against catastrophic, which the matrix scores as medium.
Risk controlsA warning sign, teaching Billy what to look for, a lifeguard watching for shark activity, and closing the water at peak times all reduce P1. A deterrent device and swimming in a group reduce P2.
Residual P1Unlikely.
Residual P2Remote.
Residual risk levelUnlikely against catastrophic, which the matrix still scores as medium.
AcceptableYes. Surfing benefits Billy’s physical and mental health, and the residual risk is accepted for experienced surfers with the controls in place.

Notice that the severity never moved. Controls change how likely the harm is, not how bad it is, which is why a catastrophic harm can stay catastrophic through a successful mitigation and still end up acceptable.

How risk control is chosen

ISO 14971 puts the three kinds of control in a fixed order of preference, and you are expected to work down the list rather than pick whichever is easiest.

1. Inherent safe design and manufacture
Remove the hazard, or remove its potential for harm, in the design itself. Mechanical keying that makes an incorrect connection physically impossible, taking a hazardous material out of the formulation, rejecting an out-of-range input before it reaches a control algorithm. The strongest option, because nothing has to work correctly, be noticed, or be read for it to hold.
2. Protective measures
Guard against a hazard you could not design out. Alarms, interlocks, fail-safe shutdowns, fuses, software watchdogs. The hazardous situation can still arise, and something has to intervene before it causes harm, so the measure itself can fail, degrade, or be bypassed, and usually needs its own reliability justification.
3. Information for safety and training
Warnings, contraindications, precautions in the labeling, and training. The weakest control, because it depends entirely on a person reading, understanding, remembering, and acting on it at the moment of use. It does not change the risk the device presents, only how likely someone is to avoid it.
As far as possible, not as low as reasonably practicable

ISO 14971 requires risk to be reduced as far as possible (AFAP), and deliberately avoids the word practicable. Cost and commercial considerations are not an acceptable reason to leave a control unimplemented. The only acceptable reasons to stop are that further reduction is not technically feasible, or that the control would introduce new risks or worsen the overall benefit and risk balance. ALARP, as low as reasonably practicable, permits a cost and benefit trade-off and is the wrong test here. The EU MDR mirrors ISO 14971 on this point.

How a safety risk work item is laid out

A safety risk carries more fields than one screen holds, so its Key details are split across seven tabs that follow the assessment in order: Details, Analysis, FMEA, Initial Risk, Control, Residual Risk, and Acceptability. The tab you need is usually the one named after the status the risk is in.

The statuses a safety risk moves through

IDENTIFICATIONCreated, with its description and category set. Editable.
ANALYSISBeing worked through with the method its category calls for: the hazard and harm, or the failure mode and what it affects.
EVALUATIONAnalysis complete. Being scored for initial P1, P2, and the resulting risk level.
CONTROLScored. Mitigations are being chosen and linked to the requirements that will implement them.
RESIDUALControls identified. Being re-scored to find what risk is left once they are in place.
CLOSURERe-scored and accepted or sent for a risk and benefit analysis. Out with the approvers.
OVERDUEAn approval passed its due date. Set a new due date and start the approval again.
CLOSEDEvery approver approved. Read-only, and it cannot be transitioned out.
REJECTEDAn approver rejected it. Read-only. Move it back to Identification to revise it.

The app validates each transition against the category, not just against the status. A design risk and a use risk leaving Analysis need different fields filled, and the app tells you which are missing rather than letting the item move. The required set for each transition is listed in Analyze and score a safety risk.

The statuses a characteristic, hazard, or harm moves through

Safety characteristics, hazards, and harms are all rulings on applicability, so they share one short lifecycle. Each starts undetermined, stays editable while you gather the evidence, then moves to whichever of the two answers applies, and locks.

UNDETERMINEDThe starting status, set on creation. Nobody has ruled on this item yet. Editable, and this is where you write the evidence or the justification.
APPLICABLEThis applies to your product, with an evidence summary saying why. Read-only.
NOT APPLICABLEThis does not apply, with a justification saying why. The justification is required before the item will move here. Read-only.
OUTDATEDReopened for revision. This is the only way to change an item you have already ruled on, and it can be reached from any status.

An item in Applicable or Not applicable cannot be edited. To change one, move it to Outdated, revise it, then rule on it again. Nothing is edited in place after a ruling, which is what keeps the register defensible.